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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF IJTAI I
Plaintili,

CaseTsw, .. . . w + - t .

H

'A

vs.
DOROTHY NANNETTE BOSS,
int.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
***

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
'lhis rnurl hi11 jurisdiction puriimiil In I If.ili ( nit \iiii, il,i/K Ja-3(J)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1
Issu 10 1: Was there sufficient evidence to support the del

0„0

lomicide

convict p

*h Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) requires an appellant to set forth "...the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority and citation to the record showing
that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Due to the fact the defendant's brief does
not state the standard of review, the State of Utah is attempting to ascertain whether the
appellant is claiming 'plain error' due to the trial court denying defendant's motions, or
'insufficiency of evidence'. Based on the issues raised by the defendant on appeal, iL_
State of Utah assumes the defendant is claiming insufficiency of evidence.5
2

Although the appellant identiho J ^jpmuit, issues m uu
appellee submits that issues 1 and 3 actually identify ^
did the defendant act with criminal negligence with n
surrounding her conduct or the result of her conduct ^
. Ma
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist oi uic result will oc^ur.
Seey 11,C A. 76-2-103(4).
1

Issue II: Was the defendant's conduct the proximate cause of the accident?
" 'When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.' " State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (2000 UT App) (quoting Spanish Fork City
v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501 (1999 UT App) (citations omitted). "However, 'before we can
uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusions of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (citations omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff does not dispute the defendant's statement of the case.3
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The defendant, Dorothy Boss, was driving on a two-lane road when she attempted
to pass at least two cars traveling in the same direction. In front of the two cars Boss
attempted to pass was a dump truck. As Boss was passing the two cars, she realized that
another vehicle was quickly approaching in the same lane from the opposite direction.
Boss attempted to squeeze her vehicle between the dump truck and the car immediately
behind the dump truck by aggressively swerving back into her original lane of travel. As
3

The defendant was also convicted of driving a motor vehicle while her
driving privilege was denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked, a class C
misdemeanor, pursuant to U.C.A. 53-3-227. The defendant is not appealing this
portion of her conviction.
2

Boss swerved back into her lane of travel, her vehicle left the paved roadway and into the
barrow pit. While in the barrow pit, Boss turned her vehicle to the left in an attempt to
return to the paved roadway and struck some type of ramp-possibly the edge of a
driveway. When Boss made contact with the ramp, her vehicle turned on its side and slid
across the paved roadway into oncoming traffic and struck a vehicle driven by Roy
Hathaway. Four year-old Jaycee Hathaway was buckled into a car seat behind her father
and suffered severe head trauma as Boss' vehicle impacted the Hathaway's car. Jaycee
Hathaway was transported via helicopter to Primary Children's Hospital but died the
same day.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 17, 2003, Dorothy Boss was driving westbound on highway 73 near
Saratoga Springs, Utah in a Nissan Altima (R. 17:8-12). Wendall Roy Hathaway, his wife
Carrie, and two children were driving eastbound on highway 73 in a Ford Crown Victoria
(R. 66: 3-14). Roy was driving the vehicle, Carrie was in the front passenger seat and
both children were in the back seat of the vehicle (R. 65: 22-25). Both children were
buckled up in car seats (R. 20:12-17). It was approximately 3:55 p.m. and both the road
conditions and weather were good (R. 66:15-21). As the Hathaways were heading
eastbound, Roy and Carrie noticed Boss' vehicle traveling westbound in the eastbound
lane (R. 67: 3-6). At the time Roy and Carrie saw Boss in their own lane of travel,
Dorothy Boss was passing two or more vehicles (R. 67:16-19). Upon seeing Boss'
3

vehicle approaching in the same lane, Roy began to slow down and pull off to the side of
the road (R. 67: 23-24). Roy estimates he was traveling approximately 65 mph (R. 68:1).
Dorothy Boss estimates she was traveling approximately 70 mph (R. 26: 12-13). The
posted speed limit was 65 mph (R. 27: 4-7, State's Exhibit No. 25). As the Hathaways
continued to watch Dorothy Boss approach in the same lane, Boss turns sharply and cuts
back into the westbound lane directly behind a dump truck. (R 68: 6-8; 82:18-24; 83: 311). After briefly disappearing behind the dump truck, Boss9 vehicle returned back into
the eastbound lane sliding sideways on the driver's side door and struck the Hathaway's
vehicle (R. 68: 13-16; 101: 16-18). At the time Boss9 vehicle struck the Hathaway's
vehicle, the Boss vehicle was on its side and after impact, the Boss vehicle dropped back
down on its wheels (R. 101: 22-25). In addition, at the point of impact, the Hathaway
vehicle had moved almost completely off the roadway and was only a few feet inside the
eastbound lane (R. 112: 4-9). Four year-old Jaycee Hathaway was sitting in the back seat
on the driver's side when the impact occurred and suffered severe head trauma from the
impact (R. 19: 7-14). Jaycee Hathaway died on the same day due to injuries sustained
from the accident (R. 75: 10-24).
Deputy Ray Edwards, employed with the Utah County Sheriff's Office, responded
to the scene of the accident and took measurements and photographs and input the
information into a computer program to help reconstruct the accident (R. 44: 22-24;
45:1). Deputy Edwards testified that because identification cones placed at the scene of
4

the accident had been moved by the medical responders, he was not able to adequately
prepare an accident reconstruction drawing (R. 46:13-25; 47: 1-4). Deputy Edwards
initially identified a point of impact but admitted that his estimate was incorrect (R. 51:
18-21). Deputy Edwards was not aware the Boss vehicle had turned on its side prior to
striking the Hathaways and, therefore, Deputy Edwards did not attempt to look for a
lifting mechanism at the scene of the accident (R. 52: 1-7; 56: 9-15). Deputy Edwards
speculated that a possible lifting mechanism may have been a new driveway that was
recently installed on the north side of the road (R. 53: 15-21). However, within 3 days of
the accident, portions of the road were torn up and reconstructed near the point of the
accident (R. 125:7-9).
Greg Duvall was hired by the State of Utah to reconstruct the accident. The court,
without objection by the defendant, recognized Duvall as an expert witness to testify
about accident reconstruction (R. 97: 3-7). Duvall stated he began the accident
reconstruction process by reviewing the police reports, accident scene photographs,
engineering survey data and data regarding the vehicles involved in the accident (R. 97:
16-24; 99: 7-11). After receiving all of the data, Duvall input this information into a
computer program and developed a drawing indicating, among other things, the edge of
the pavement, the lane edges, the center lines, gouge marks and where the vehicles came
to rest (R. 99: 13-23). Duvall testified he worked backwards from the point where the
vehicles came to rest and utilizing all of the data, he attempted to demonstrate how the
5

accident occurred (R. 100: 7-9). Duvall testified the Boss vehicle was on its left side, the
driver's side, as it came sliding across the highway and made contact with the Hathaways
(R. 101:16-18).
Duvall testified there were no indications suggesting that when Boss swerved her
vehicle from the eastbound lane back into the westbound lane, that her car began to slide
sideways (R. 103: 18-25). Therefore, in order for Boss' vehicle to turn onto the driver's
side, the vehicle would need to leave the paved roadway and hit a ramp or some other
mechanism causing the vehicle to turn on its side (R. 104: 17-21). There was no evidence
Boss' vehicle made contact with any item on the paved road causing the vehicle to turn
on its side (R. 104: 14-16). Duvall stated that when Boss left the paved roadway, she
possibly made contact with a driveway which acted like a ramp, and combined with Boss
turning the steering wheel to the left as she made contact with the ramp, her vehicle
turned on its side and proceeded into the eastbound lane (R. 106: 23-25; 107: 1-10). In
order for Boss to make contact with the driveway, Boss' vehicle left the paved roadway
(R. 107: 19-21). Duvall testified that in order for Boss' vehicle to travel from the
eastbound lane, onto the westbound shoulder and strike the driveway, Boss would need to
employ hard, aggressive steering. Boss' steering was beyond what is normally required to
return back into her lane of travel (R. 109: 5-13). Duvall was unable to determine the
speed of Boss's vehicle at the point of impact (R. 109: 16-18). There was no evidence

6

suggesting Boss struck the dump truck as she attempted to pull behind the dump truck
and in front of the cars she was passing (R. 110: 9-13).
Duvall testified that in his opinion, Roy Hathaway was not negligent because he
moved to the right of the roadway as he recognized Boss approaching in his lane of
travel, and that his foot was apparently covering the brake pedal because he initiated
braking and started to skid just before the collision (R. 112: 14-23). Although Duvall was
unable to calculate the speed of Boss' vehicle, speed did play a role in Boss leaving the
paved roadway (R. 112: 22-25; 113: 1-10). If Boss would have kept her vehicle on the
roadway, there is nothing to suggest her vehicle would have turned on its side (R. 113:
11-16). Duvall stated that in his opinion Boss was negligent by steering her vehicle in
such an aggressive manner which caused her to leave the roadway and onto the gravel
shoulder and resulted in her vehicle turning on its side (R. 113: 17-25; 114: 1-6).
Mr. Dennis Andrews was hired by Intermountain Claims to investigate the
accident on behalf of an insurance company and was recognized as an expert witness in
accident reconstruction (R. 132:1-3, 9-10). Mr. Andrews testified he was unable to
identify the event which caused defendant's vehicle to roll on its side (R. 136: 1-2).
However, Mr. Andrews testified that in his opinion, Dorothy Boss acted negligently and
he explained his reasons for his opinion (R. 137).

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: In order for a person to be found criminally negligent, the person does
not need to be aware but ought to be aware of a substantial risk and that the result will
occur. In other words, Dorothy Boss did not need to know that a lifting mechanism
actually existed in the barrow pit which could cause her vehicle to turn on its side.
Dorothy Boss can be criminally negligent if a reasonable person ought to know that by
aggressively swerving a car on a roadway while traveling 70 mph would cause the car to
leave the road. In addition, when a vehicle leaves the road traveling 70 mph, a reasonable
person ought to know that the vehicle may come in contact with some object causing the
vehicle to either flip over or roll onto its side.
Point II: Dorothy Boss' actions can be the proximate cause of th traffic accident
even if she did not know that some object in the barrow pit would act as a lifting
mechanism causing her vehicle to turn on its side. A person's actions can be the
i

proximate cause of an injury so long as the later event can be reasonably expected as a
result of the natural sequence of events initiated by that person.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT PASSING
SEVERAL VEHICLES AT THE SAME TIME ON A TWO-LANE ROAD
AND SWERVING HER VEHICLE AT 70 MPH CREATED AN
UNJUSTIFIABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL RISK.
Defendant cites to the case of State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, (UT App 1989) to

support her contention that her conduct does not rise to the level of criminal negligence.
8.

In Larsen, the defendant was driving a Ford Ranger, approached an intersection, pulled
into the left-hand turn lane and prepared to make a left turn. The light turned red and the
defendant waited in the turn lane until the light changed to green. After the light changed
to green, the defendant briefly waited and then began his left turn. A Subaru Legacy,
approaching the same intersection from the other direction, entered the intersection at the
same time as the defendant began making his left turn and collided with the defendant's
vehicle. An individual in the Subaru was killed and the defendant was charged with
negligent homicide.
At trial, the court received evidence indicating the weather was dry and although it
was dusk, it was still light outside. The court also found that, "Neither driver slowed
down or swerved to avoid the accident." Id. at 1254. At the conclusion of the trial,
defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide and failure to yield the right-of-way.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for negligent homicide. The defendant asserted "...that the trial court erred in
its legal conclusions by failing to concede that defendant's driving could be outside the
ordinary standard of care, or simply negligent, without rising to the level of criminal
negligence."/*/, at 1256.
In reviewing the defendant's claims on appeal, the court stated that, "Conduct is
not criminally negligent unless is constitutes a 'gross deviation from the standard of care
exercised by an ordinary person.'" Larsen at 1257, (quoting State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d

9

254, 267 (Utah 1988)). The court in Larsen also referred to State v. Warden, 784 P.2d
1204, 1207 (UT App 1989) explaining that '"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment
resulting even in death of another in not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it
so.'" Larsen at 1257. Finally, as part of its analysis, the court looked at State v. Hallet,
619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980), claiming that '"The 'negligence' required in this context
must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must be something more
than mere inadvertence or misadventure, but rather a recklessness or indifference
incompatible with a proper regard for human life.'" Larsen at 1257.
In looking at all of the factors presented at trial, the appellate court in Larsen
determined there was no nexus between the collision and the small amount of alcohol in
the defendant's system, unlit headlights, and the defendant's failure to activate his turn
signal. The court held that "[t]he facts presented at trial do not indicate that defendant's
actions were undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life, nor does the
quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions were criminal. Rather,
defendant simply failed to see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he
made a left turn, with tragic consequences." Id. The Utah Court appeals reversed Larsen's
conviction of negligent homicide. Contrasting the Larsen case with the case at hand, the
plaintiff submits that Dorothy Boss' actions went beyond simply failing to see an
oncoming car.

10

In the present case, Dorothy Boss was in a hurry to pick up her children from
grade school. Grade school ended at 3:30 p.m., the accident occurred at 3:55 p.m. and the
defendant was still 5 to 6 miles from the school (R. 26: 4-10). Due to the defendant being
late to pick up her children, she was attempting to pass at least two cars at the same time
on a two-lane road. Before Boss began her passing maneuver, it is presumed she looked
into the oncoming lane of traffic and made a conscious decision that she could complete
the pass and safely return to her own lane of travel before making contact with the
oncoming vehicle. However, it is also presumed that Boss was able to see the dump truck
traveling ahead of the two cars and in undertaking the passing maneuver, she either
intended to pass the two cars and the dump truck or at some point she determined that she
would not be able to pass the dump truck and attempted to squeeze her vehicle behind the
dump truck.4 These facts, along with the defendant's admission that she was speeding,
distinguishes the Larsen case from the case at hand.
The defendant in Larsen simply failed to see an oncoming car and turns his vehicle
into the approaching Subaru. However, the defendant in the case at hand takes a
calculated risk that she is able to make it past several vehicles and safely return to her
own lane. When the defendant realizes the Hathaway vehicle was quickly approaching,
instead of safely merging back into her own lane of travel, the defendant turns so
aggressively that her vehicle shoots back across the paved roadway and into the barrow

4

Although Dorothy Boss testified at trial, she claimed that she had no independent
memory of the accident (R. 144: 22-24).
11

pit. The totality of defendant's actions rise to the level of indifference and fail to show a
proper regard for human life. Both accident reconstructionists testified that in their
opinions, the defendant's passing maneuver, her speed and steering were beyond that of a
what is expected by a normal person and were considered negligent (R. 109; 112- 114;
136-137).
The plaintiff seeks to clarify one aspect of the decision set forth in Lars en. The
court in Larsen stated, "The facts presented at trial do not indicate the defendant's
actions were undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life,..." Larsen at
1257. (Emphasis added). Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103 defines the separate culpable
mental states which are required for different crimes. The crime of manslaughter requires
a mens rea of recklessness and a person acts recklessly when he "... is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk..." Utah Code Ann. §76-2103(3). "In contrast, the mens rea for criminal negligence constituting negligent homicide
is that defendant was unaware of but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk the
result would occur." State v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 525 (UT App 1989). Therefore,
the analysis to determine whether a person acts with recklessness or with criminal
negligence is different. The courts have declared that "...the distinction between the mens
rea for each crime is one of intent, [State v. Howard, 597 P.2d at 881], the court in Dyer
further clarified that the distinction involves the degree of perception of risk." Wessendorf
at 525 (citing to State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). Therefore, the court in

12

Larsen should not have used the term 'reckless5 when determining whether the defendant
was guilty of negligent homicide.
In addition to the eye witness testimony and the expert opinions regarding
reconstruction of the accident, the jury in the case at hand was given the following
instruction: "A vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the center of the roadway
in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless the left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance to permit
overtaking and passing to be completed without interfering with the operation of any
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of any vehicle overtaken" (R: 176: 7-14).
As the jury considered all of the evidence, listened to the jury instructions defining
criminal negligence and was instructed on the law regarding when a vehicle may pass
another vehicle, the plaintiff submits there was sufficient evidence demonstrating
Dorothy Boss ought to have been aware that her actions created a substantial and
unjustifiable risk and that her failure to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise as viewed from Boss' standpoint.

IL THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY EVEN IF THERE WAS ALSO
ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.
The defendant also seeks to overturn her conviction claiming the State failed to
demonstrate the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. In fact,

13

defendant claims the "evidence here was based on speculation and conjecture relating to
the cause of the accident." Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The crux of defendant's argument
regarding proximate cause is as follows: Since the State is unable to adequately identify
the lifting mechanism which caused defendant's car to turn on its side, the "independent
and unknown force" is the cause of the accident and not a result of defendant's conduct.
M a t p. 19.
In the case of State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the defendant was
charged with negligent homicide after he bent over a stop sign at an intersection and a
driver approaching the intersection failed to see the bent over stop sign and collided with
another vehicle killing one of the occupants. The defendant was convicted of negligent
homicide and the trial court "expressly found that the defendant should have foreseen that
his removal of the stop sign created a substantial risk of injury or death to others; and that
doing so constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances." Hallet at 338. On appeal, the defendant claimed
he was not the proximate cause of the death claiming "there was evidence that as the
deceased approached from the south, she was exceeding the speed limit of 25 mph; and
that this was the subsequent intervening and proximate cause of her own death." Id. The
court dismissed the defendant's claim on several fronts that the deceased's speed was a
subsequent intervening and proximate cause of her own death and one of the court's
explanations provides appropriate insight into the issue of proximate cause. The court

14

declared, "It is also held that where a party by his wrongful conduct creates a condition of
peril, his action can properly be found to be the proximate cause of a resulting injury,
even though later events which combined to cause the injury may also be classified as
negligent, so long as the latter act is something which can reasonably be expected to
follow in the natural sequence of events." Id. at 339. In other words, even a subsequent
intervening negligent act will not abrogate a person's culpability so long as that person
created the initial perilous condition. In applying this holding to the present case, not even
the defendant claims that the lifting mechanism was a negligent act but rather, the lifting
mechanism was some inanimate object that may have been a driveway or a mound of dirt.
Therefore, if a subsequent negligent act by a third party does not relieve a person from
being the proximate cause of an injury, so long as that person creates the peril, how can
an unidentifiable lump in the barrow pit shield the defendant from responsibility? The
evidence presented at trial supports the State's position that the defendant created the
perilous condition due to her own choices, and the consequences of her choices caused
her vehicle to leave the roadway, encounter some item in the barrow pit and causing her
vehicle to turn on its side.
The defendant cites to the Arkansas Supreme Court case of Ayers v. State, 444
S.W. 2d 695 (1969) to support her claim that speculation and conjecture as to the cause of
an accident cannot support a conviction. In Ayers, two vehicles collided on a two-lane
road and no one was able to testify about witnessing the accident. Id. at 697. There was
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no evidence presented as to which direction the vehicles were traveling and "[t]he only
evidence that either vehicle was being driven in a reckless or wanton disregard of the
safety of others, at the time of the collision, was the circumstantial evidence consisting of
debris and marks on the pavement, tending to prove that the two automobiles came
together with the point of impact being about two feet north of the center line, in the west
bound traffic lane of the highway." Id.5 The court held that, "[t]he criminal negligence in
this case falls most heavily on the driver who crossed the center line of the highway, and
the evidence in the record before us would require surmise and conjecture for a
determination of which driver crossed the center line." Id at 700. Therefore, the appellate
court in Ayers refused to uphold the trial court's conviction of negligent homicide
because there was insufficient evidence demonstrating which driver crossed over the line.
In the present case, there is no speculation or doubt that Dorothy Boss swerved from the
passing lane into her original lane of travel, left the roadway causing her vehicle to turn
on its side and collide with the Hathaways. The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to
uphold Ayers' conviction because it could not determine which driver created the perilous
condition of crossing over the center line. However, it is obvious and without dispute in
the present case as to which driver created the perilous condition which resulted in the
death of another individual. Therefore, the Ayers case is readily distinguishable from the
case at hand.

5

It is of interest to note that both driver's had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 and both were
deemed to be driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Ayers at 697.
16

The defendant also cites to the case of State of Washington v. McAllister, 806 P.2d
772 (1991) to bolster her position that an intervening act by a third person broke the
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury of another
individual.6 In McAllister, the defendant was driving a 1966 Volkswagen van while
intoxicated. Riding in the back of the van was the defendant's 27 year-old daughter who
was also intoxicated. As the defendant was driving, he remembered leaving his jacket at
the tavern and turned the vehicle around and headed back towards the tavern. At some
point while turning the van around, the defendant's daughter fell out of the van's sliding
door and died as a result of her injuries. The defendant testified at trial that he was
traveling between 10 to 15 mph while turning the van around, which testimony was
corroborated other eyewitnesses. Id at 775. There was also evidence presented that the
sliding door to the van was old and may have been improperly secured earlier in the day
by the defendant's wife. Id. "The State's only evidence that Mr. McAllister was negligent
was a tire mark which purportedly came from the Volkswagen van and the reconstruction
testimony of an officer admitted he was not an expert in the field of accident
reconstruction and who did not witness the accident. We find such evidence insufficient
to demonstrate negligence." Id.
In supporting its reversal of the trial court's conviction, the court in McAllister
declared that, "[w]hen the independent intervening act of a third person was one which
6

The case of State v. McAllister has been abrogated by State v. Roggenkamp, 106 P.3d
196 (2005), however, the State still chooses to respond to the defendant's argument
relating to proximate cause.
17

was not incumbent upon the defendant to have anticipated as reasonably likely to happen,
then there is a break in the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiffs injury." Id. (Emphasis added). Once again, as in the above-cited case of State v.
Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), the appellate court looked to whether a superceding act
caused by a third party contributed to the injury and broke the causal connection
stemming from the defendant's own negligence. The State reiterates that in the present
case, there was not an intervening nor superceding act by a third party which broke the
causal connection initiated by the defendant's own negligence. Therefore, the State
submits that the factors identified in the case of State v. McAllister are distinguishable
from the present case and should not be relied upon-even as non-binding authority.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits there was sufficient
evidence presented at trial and requests the Court to affirm the defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this Jo

day of April 2005.

TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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